THE TRIBALISATION OF LOGIC by Edor, Edor John
THE TRIBALISATION OF LOGIC 
 
 BY 
 
EDOR, J. EDOR Ph.D 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR 
CALABAR, CROSS RIVER STATE 
Email: edorjb2k@yahoo.com  
 
Abstract 
 
There exists a relationship between logic and world-views. Why are there different world-
views, even of the same subject-matter? Why would two different persons analyse a 
particular subject-matter and come-up with different results of the analysis? In attempting 
to answer the aforementioned posers, some scholars have maintained that it is only 
normal and expected that two different persons analysing the same subject-matter should 
come-up with different analysis-results of the subject-matter. This class of scholars hold 
this view because, as they maintain, each "tribe", as it were, is naturally endowed by 
nature with its unique and peculiar logic with which it grapples with its own idiosyncratic 
issues confronting it. Therefore, the logic with which "A" grapples with a particular 
subject-matter is essentially unique to "A" and different from the logic with which "B" 
confronts the same subject-matter. It is because of the use of these unique and subjective 
"logics", the reasoning goes, that the end-results of the analyses of the same subject-
matter would usually, if not necessarily, be different. The thesis of this paper, however, is 
that logic qua logic, cannot be tribalised, much less manufactured to suit different peoples 
from different tribes. Logic is the given tools with which wo/man grapples with the 
realities that confront and surround her/him. The tribalization and/or manufacture of 
"logics" is an unwholesome venture, and an unholy exercise which carries with it massive 
and catastrophic consequences identified within this work.   
Introduction 
 There are various branches of philosophy. These include epistemology, 
metaphysics, logic, aesthetics, ethics, jurisprudence, philosophy of science, axiology, 
philosophy of mathematics, etc. These branches of philosophy are legitimate areas of 
study/investigation appertaining to their subject-matters. Epistemology is the study of the 
theories of knowledge, metaphysics is the study of Being. What then is aesthetics? 
Aesthetics is the study of theories of beauty, while ethics is the study of theories of 
rightness and wrongness of human actions. For jurisprudence, it is the philosophical study 
of legal concepts and theories, philosophy of science is the philosophical study of the 
concepts and theories of  science, philosophy of mathematics is the philosophical study of 
the concepts  and theories of mathematics, while axiology is the study of theories of 
values. As it is with the aforementioned branches of philosophy, so is it with the other 
branches of philosophy that are not mentioned here, that they all have their legitimate and 
independent subject-matters. By independent subject-matters here I mean unique and 
peculiar approaches to study or investigate a particular subject-matter for the purpose 
relevant to the branch of philosophy. 
 It is not uncommon nor is it anymore strange to go through published books and 
find some helpless resignation to fate on the inability to find universally accepted 
definitions of most disciplines. For example, law is variously defined by different 
scholars. Let us take an example of the definition of  international law. G. I. Tunkin, for 
example, has defined international law as: 
The aggregate of norms which are created by agreement between 
states of different social systems, reflecting the concordant wills of 
states and  have a generally democratic character, regulate  relations  
between them in the process of struggle  and co-operation in the 
direction of ensuring peace and peaceful co-existence and freedom 
and independence of peoples, and are secured when necessary  by 
coercion effectuated by states individually or collectively (251). 
In a manner obviously radically contradictory to professor Tunkin’s definition of 
international law: Prof.  Kozhevnikov, a Russian and one time Justice of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), in his book International law maintains that: 
International law can be defined as the aggregate of rules governing 
relations between states in the process of their conflict and co-
operation, designed to safeguard their peaceful co-existence, 
expressing the will  of the ruling classes of these states and 
defended in case of need by coercion applied by states individually 
or collectively (7). 
 While professor Tunkin’s definition of international law presents it as a concept 
that is essentially democratic in character, Professor Kozhevnikov presents a somewhat 
oppressive character of international law whereby the rest of the world is politically, 
economically, socially, religiously, held hostage by the will of the ruling classes. As 
mentioned earlier, these disciplinary variations are not essentially peculiar to such a 
discipline as jurisprudence. In fact, it does appear to me that there is hardly any such 
discipline that is not susceptible to this fate as it concerns definitional variations.  
Though this scandal of definitional variations persists, every discipline enjoys a 
substantial degree of residual  thematic content. This residual thematic content makes 
intra-disciplinary discourses, debates and engagements possible, thereby circumventing  
the wild goose chase pretentions that the scandal of  disciplinary definitional  variations 
would plunge us into. Again, this residual disciplinary thematic content comes like a ray 
of light in a tunnel of impenetrable darkness conferring legitimacy to questions as to the 
definitions of various disciplines. Therefore, to ask the question, “what is logic?” would 
no longer appear as preposterous as it would at first glance appear. 
 
The Nature of Logic  
 As   has already been alluded to, an homogeneous definition of logic has proven a 
daunting task (Frank Harrisons, 2). To some, logic is a science that studies the relations 
that exist between and among realities. A major proponent of this relational character of 
logic, Professor Okezie Ijiomah maintains as follows: 
This is why we can define logic, as the science that seeks to find 
what should be the correct relationships between and among 
realities through human reason and by the aid of this knowledge, 
principles of argument, hence correct judgment can be reached. By 
realities we mean those propositions or statements which are 
representations of things or state of affairs (1995, 11-12).    
In a recent book published in 2014, Ijomah has not shifted grounds on this definition of 
logic(14). To him then, logic is essentially the study of the relationships that hold between 
and among realities. On his part, Ben Dupré evinces that: 
Logic is the science of analyzing argument and of establishing 
principles or foundations on which sound inferences can be made. 
As such its concern is not with the particular content of arguments 
but with their general structure (108).  
Clarifying his point further, Ben Dupré  continued: 
So, given an argument such as ‘All birds are feathered; the robin is a 
bird; therefore the robin is feathered’, the logician abstracts the form 
‘All Fs are G; a is an F; so a is G’, in which the particular terms are 
replaced by symbols and the strength of the inference can be 
determined independently of the subject matter (108-109).   
Irving  Copi, in his own stead, conceives logic as the study of the rules and principles 
used to distinguish  good (correct) from bad (incorrect) reasoning (3). In this view that 
logic essentially deals  with the rules and art of distinguishing  correct,  from incorrect, 
arguments, Copi is supported by Robert Sharvey (1-2), and Nancy Simco and Gene James 
(1). The conception of logic as a science of argumentation is all the more strengthened by 
D.N. Ucheaga as she upholds that “in adducing proofs or evidence for the beliefs we hold, 
we need to test them to ascertain whether or not they are well grounded. Logic is this 
test… the position herein is that arguments are central to the study of logic...”(15). The 
trio of Schagrin, Rapapart and Dipert in their book Logic: A Computer Approach have 
defined logic in a manner that probably only permits me to describe them as relativists in 
matters logical. Of logic, they espouse: 
Logic, in its broadest sense, is the study of correct reasoning. It 
produces and examines methods for identifying good reasoning, as 
well as bad reasoning, in all places: in our own thought, in the 
writings of others, and in the conversation of our friends. Logic 
provides rules for determining how we should move from one belief 
to another. Seen in this way, logic gives us the standards for 
determining which beliefs are acceptable on the basis of other 
beliefs… To produce the standards of “correct reasoning” in all 
fields - everyday life, psychology, history, physics, and mathematics 
– would obviously be a very tall order. In different areas, and in 
different circumstances, there are varying standards of “correct 
reasoning” (1). 
Carney and Scheer define logic as “…the study of arguments and of methods to 
determine whether arguments are correct or incorrect (3). 
 Having considered some popular definitions of logic, what can one say is the 
common thread that runs through all, or most, of those definitions? Put otherwise, in the 
parlance I have adopted in this paper, what is the residual disciplinary (or definitional) 
thematic content of logic? We can safely say: 
(1) That argumentation is central to logic. 
(2) That the study of the rules/techniques/principles used in distinguishing a good 
from a bad argument falls within the domain of logic. 
 I am afraid, if I go further, I may trigger resistance. I rather stop short there. The 
claim supported by the thesis above of residual disciplinary/definitional thematic content 
is that it would not be repugnant to any definition of logic to hold that it appertains to 
argumentation, and rules/techniques/principles employed to discriminate between good 
and bad arguments. The relativist, the pluralist, the universalist, the African, the 
European, the Caribbean, etc. would readily find the thematic contents expounded above 
congenial with whatever view she may hold of logic. Having said this, it is left to be 
considered in this paper whether logic, given its nature afore-described herein, can be 
fragmented according as tribes of peoples differ. Couched differently, is there any 
justification for the view that each tribe of a people is naturally endowed with its own 
idiosyncratic and peculiar rules/techniques/principles for determining which argument, in 
their various milieux, is good and which is bad? Or is anything else meant by logical 
relativity? Probably! May be, I should not have said ‘naturally endowed with’. Okay! 
Expunging the phrase ‘naturally endowed with’ from the posers above, it would now 
read: is there any justification for the view that each tribe of a people is entitled  to the 
creation/manufacture of its own idiosyncratic and peculiar rules/techniques/principles 
for determining which argument, in their various milieux, is good and which is bad? The 
rendition of the problematique of the relativity of logic presented above may appear 
alarming to some, then an exaggeration to others, yet a disservice to many. But how else 
would you interpret the following: 
To produce the standards of “correct reasoning” in all fields – 
everyday life, psychology, history, physics, and mathematics – 
would obviously be a very tall order. In different areas, and in 
different circumstances, there are varying standards of “correct 
reasoning” (Schagrin, Rapapont and Dipert, 1). 
By the phraseology “To produce the standards of ‘correct reasoning’...” used by the 
authors immediately quoted above, ipso facto, logic, in their conception, is to be created 
or manufactured  for every tribe and, as a matter of course, every field of endeavour. This, 
certainly and ultimately, calls to question their understanding of logic. Is it not yet another 
scandal to suppose that the laws of thought which are essentially the 
rules/techniques/principles used for determining good, from bad argument are to be 
created/invented/manufactured? The creationist theory of logic is enjoying a somewhat 
significant popularity in 21st century Africa. We shall later return to this point. For now, 
let us focus further on the nature of logic. 
 
Aprioristic, and Formalistic Conceptions Logic 
 Most of the quagmire bedeviling scholarship today as regards the true nature of 
logic is necessarily connected with the discrimination between aprioristic conception of 
logic and formalistic conception of logic. This separation of logic into the aprioristic and 
the formalistic types is inextricably connected with the question of the origin of logic. 
 The aprioristic conception of logic espouses the view that the 
rules/techniques/principles used for separating good, from bad, arguments are naturally 
embedded in a human person from birth. Seen this way these rules/techniques/principles 
are substantially synonymous with the laws of thought. Elaborating on this point, Hans 
Reichenbach submits: 
In the history of philosophy, there are two interpretations of logic 
which have played dominant roles, and which have endured to form 
the main subject matter of discussions on logic in our own day. For 
the first interpretation, which we may call the aprioristic 
interpretation, logic is a science with its own authority, whether it is 
founded in the a priori nature of reason, or in the psychological 
nature of thought, or in intellectual intuition or evidence – 
philosophers have provided us with many phrases, the task of which 
is to express that we simply have to submit to logic as a kind of 
superior command (334). 
Reichenbach places within this class of logicians such philosophers as Plato, most 
scholastic philosophers, Rene Descartes, Gottfried Leibniz, Immanuel Kant, Boole, Venn, 
Keynes, etc. For this class of scholars, logic, in the sense of laws of thought, is a given. 
The creationist/manufacturist account of the nature of logic  would amount to a repulsive 
endeavour to the aprioristic logicians. 
 The other school of thought as regards the origin of logic is the formalistic 
conception of logic. In the view of this class of scholars, logic is an invention by people. 
Speaking of this group, Reichenbach  writes: 
The second interpretation does not acknowledge logic as a material 
science and may be called the formalistic interpretation of logic. 
The adherents of this interpretation do not believe in an a priori 
character of logic. They refuse even to talk of the “laws of logic”, 
this term suggesting that there is something in the nature of an 
authority in logic which we have to obey. For them logic is a system 
of rules which by no means determines  the content of science, and 
which do nothing but furnishing a transformation of one proposition 
into another any addition to intension (335). 
In this class of logicians, Hans Reichenbach places such philosophers as the nominalists 
of the middle ages, David Hume, Hilbert, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, etc. Reichenbach 
clarified that he used the term “formalistic” in a sense somewhat wider than the sense in 
use within the discussion of modern logistic, where the formalists are represented by the 
narrower group centering around Hilbert (335). Logic, from the formalistic conception, is 
simply a matter of internal coherence of a set/unit of propositions in their relationship one 
with anther based primarily, and exclusively, on a set of rules/techniques/principles 
hitherto agreed upon within a universe of discourse. Logic has got nothing to do with the 
human nature, they would say. The game of chess, for instance, is a universe of discourse 
with its own artificially created/invented rules/techniques/principles of the game. Such is 
logic. 
The Ontologico-Pluralistic Conception of Logic  
 There is a third interpretation or conception of logic which Reichenbach did not 
identify. It is for any of the following three reasons that Reichenbach did not identify this 
third  group of logicians: 
(1) He probably simply refrained from identifying it. 
(2) He probably simply was not exposed to sufficient African literature on the subject-
matter, or 
(3) His failure to identify this third school may simply be due to the relatively recent 
development of the ontologico-pluralistic  conception of logic.  
 To have a bird’s eye view of this conception of logic, consider the following 
passages: 
…at any time discussions centre on logic, reality issues are 
assumed. If ontology from our discussion is relative and it correlates 
with logic and the function is a connectivity exercise, then logic is 
correctly defined by twentieth century analytic philosophers as the 
science of relation between realities from where correct thinking, 
argumentation and hence valid and sound conclusions can be 
reached (Ijiomah, 2014,59-60). 
Another prolific writer and commentator on this issue avers as follows: 
Indeed, why can’t there be an Africa logic? What will be the reasons 
for its non-existence as for its existence?...if logic, like philosophy, 
is culture based as some agree, then Africans would have logic or 
they would not have culture (Okeke, 143).  
Again, Ozumba and Chimakonam explicitly say: 
We may define a thought system as the aggregate of a people’s 
basic belief which determine their norms and judgment on what is 
acceptable or unacceptable in accordance with established 
consensus. It determines the rules within which a people’s reflection 
on realities is organized. In other words, a thought system consists 
of (but not only) the perspectives through which a people rationally 
look at reality,  i.e. it is the aggregate  of beliefs, assumptions, and 
norms which have become  basic  in a  given society and which  
define  a people’s reasoning and understanding  of realities  around 
them. We want to posit in this work that Africa has a peculiar 
thought system which is trivalent in structure. In other words, it is 
different from the Western thought system which is bivalent, hence  
obeying the law of contradiction (18).   
 From the passages considered above, there is clearly a trend developing among 
some African scholars (this is not say that scholars from other continental regions may 
not adopt a similar line of reasoning). The above perspective is clearly a perspective on 
the nature of logic. But it is different from the aprioristic  conception of  logic and the  
formalistic  conception  of logic. Then, the question is: where does the difference lie?  
The aprioristic conception of logic holds the view that logic is a given, the laws of 
thought are naturally embedded in every normal human person. Because of the uniform 
distribution of the laws of thought to every normal human person, they are universal in 
nature. From the passages quoted above, those ardent and consummate African 
philosophers hold fastidiously to a different view; the view that logic is relative to all 
tribes, as it were. Again, the perspective of logic as deducible from the passages under 
consideration is also different from the formalistic conception of logic. The difference lies 
in the fact that the formalistic conception maintains that for each subject-matter, every 
discipline, every context, every topic, every theory, probably at each material time, a 
logic is created for each and every circumstance. What matters, they say, is the internal 
coherence of the particular logic adopted for the handling of the issue. The 
rules/techniques/principles of the   game of chess, they reason, are designed by the creator 
of chess. The passages from the African scholars under consideration rather maintain that 
each reality, i.e. each ontology imposes a logic on the perceiving cognitive agent for its 
understanding. Logic, therefore, is ontology-specific. Since world-views, realities, 
ontologies, differ from place to place, from clime to clime, from time to time, so too do 
‘logics’ differ. For this reason, we couch this conception of logic as the ontologico-
plurlistic conception of logic. 
 The ontologico-pluralistic conception  of logic upholds that logic does not have an 
absolutist or universal  coloration whereby every normal human person is naturally 
embedded with given rules/techniques/principles for dealing  with each and every 
problem  in every circumstance, nor is logic  artificially created for resolution or 
dissolution of problems or wonders. Logic is ontology-specific, therefore relative. 
‘Logics’ vary, therefore pluralistic. Making the point portentously clear, Ijiomah writes:  
 
…every logic is a science of relation between or among realities. 
And since every culture has its particular  view of any reality and  
since as a matter of course, the view of a people on the  nature of  
realities affects whatever relationships the people may perceive as  
existing between the realities, the ethnorationlists maintain that a 
people’s logic is bound to be unique to their culture [tribe] 
(Emphasis mine, 2000, 142). 
 
Reasons for the Tribalisation  of Logic 
 I have left the treatment of the defects of the formalistic conception of logic for 
another occasion. As for the ontologico-pluralistic  conception of logic, the question is: is 
there any justification for the espousal of its view?  It does appear to me that the positing 
of this saccharine species of logic is reactionary. Some Western scholars like Hegel and 
Levy-Bruhl had made unguarded, unjustifiable, sardonic, unscholarly and irresponsible 
comments about the cognitive capacities of Africans. While Hegel says Africa is a-
historical, Levy-Bruhl says Africa is pre-logical (17). These remarks are absolutely 
uncanny, generalistic and hyperbolic. Those unfounded statements tumultuously stirred 
the gentle and calm African waters. Responding  to Uduma’s article  entitled  “Can there 
be an African Logic”, Jonathan Chima Okeke reacts: 
His (Uduma) was a hypothetical question based on the condition of 
inability. Hence, can there be an African logic where Africans are pre-
logical? (Levy-Bruhl, 17) pre-logicality meaning anything from lack of 
super culture to mental deficiency (2011, 142).  
In his recent book entitled Harmonious  Monism: A Philosophical Logic of Explanation 
for Ontological Issues in Supernaturalism in African Thought,  Ijiomah identified  that 
Levy-Bruhl – in his book Primitive  Mentality - accused Africans of being mystically-
oriented, lacking  objectivity in their analysis of issues, being participatory (maintaining  
the simultaneous cogency of both the material and the spiritual), and that Africans  do not 
demarcate between the objects and the subjects  that investigate  the world of object (2-3). 
Now, Ijiomah lands: 
The consequence of the above and the final onslaught of 
Levy-Bruhl against  third-world which includes Africa is that 
the third world has a pre-logical mentality. To be pre-logical 
means to stand or exist prior to logic, it means to be outside 
the universe of discourse or the operational influence of logic 
(3). 
What again do you need to identify the burden, the pain and the challenge of the “African 
logician”? Levy-Bruhl’s insult and his final onslaught must be arrested, arraigned, 
prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to death, not through any decent means like lethal 
injection, but by firing squared in public glare. After the execution of the insult and final 
onslaught, its place must be taken by another, thus arose the manufacture of “African 
logic”. “African logic” therefore is both a reactionary logic and an apologetic logic. It is 
reactionary because its invention/manufacture is a reaction to some Western scholar’s 
uncanny, unwitty and  derogatory remarks  about Africans’  mental capability, and 
apologetic because  it is basically and primarily an exercise  in defence of the African’s 
mental capability. The reactionary and apologetic character of the origin of the 
ontologico-pluralistic conception of logic has been further elaborated on in an article 
entitled: Why Play into their Hands: A Rejoinder to the Attempts at Manufacturing 
African Logics (Edor, 174-183). But, are the above the reasons why we consider the 
creation/manufacture of “African logic” implausible? No! 
Against the Tribalisation of Logic 
 Logic is the study of the rules/techniques/principles used in discriminating 
between good arguments from bad arguments and the application of those 
rules/techniques/principles. These rules/techniques/principles are essentially and 
necessarily within the domain of the laws of thought.  The laws of thought are given. 
They are a common heritage of all mankind. They are a universal blessing to every 
normal human person. They are not created, they are not invented, they are not 
manufactured by man. The laws of thought are a  cogno-mental capacity, they are like 
farming tools with which  the farmer engages the forest. The tools here were not acquired 
by the farmer, they were donated to the farmer, in this instance, by nature. The 
ontologico-pluralistic  conception of logic would have us believe that the  justification for 
the espousal of pluralistic “logics” is that realties differ, from subject-matter to subject-
matter, from place to place, from time to time, from culture to culture. The adherents of 
ontologico-pluralistic conception of logic seem to be saying that the “logic” of physics is 
different from the “logic” of chemistry, the “logic” of law is different from the “logic” of 
philosophy, the “logic” of  polygamy  is different from the “logic” of monogamy, the 
“logic” of football is different from the “logic” of chess, therefore, the “logic” of man is 
different from the “logic” of a woman.  By implication, to grapple with the problem of 
corruption requires an essentially  unique  and  peculiar “logic” different  from the “logic” 
that would be required to confront the problem of  environmental pollution. Even for the 
same subject-matter like environmental pollution, the ontologico-pluralist  would have us 
maintain that the Asian needs a different “logic”, from the European,  to confront it. 
Logic, they say, is infinitesimally relative to subject-matters, cultures, times, tribes and 
ethnic groups of persons. The Mbaise man’s “logic” in dealing with the problem of the 
political marginalization of the Igbo region in Nigeria must be, or better still, ought be, 
different from the Arochukwu  man’s “logic” in grappling with the same issue. Logic 
would then be so incurably relativistic that it becomes infinitesimally pluralistic. In fact, 
this line of argument, when extended further according to the requirement of ontologico-
pluralistic conception of logic, it will ultimately lead to logical nihilism. To suppose that 
one needs to attack uncanny Eurocentric posture by deliberating  attempting to create a 
lacuna, where it does not exist, in logic, in order to legitimize the bonafide membership of 
the African in the comity  of scholars, carries with it catastrophic and massive 
consequences. To me, any prefix to the term logic is a misnomer. It is true that cultures 
vary, even the advocates of the aprioristic conception of logic would hardly deny this 
(Asiegbu 42). Cultural relativity means 
…that culture situates a philosopher, limiting him to a 
specifically designed group and experience, problems, 
difficulties and presuppositions of a particular people. In 
addition, culture gives an orientation to his philosophy in so 
far as he seeks to provide ultimate answers to questions, and 
solutions to problems of a people of a particular culture. 
Since all philosophical discourse involves seeking answers to 
problems and issues, which a culture raises, then culture is 
determinative of philosophy. As different and varied as 
cultures are, so also are the questions, answers and 
philosophies they generate.  Culture, however significant it 
is, remains limited to a specific region. The Western culture 
is different from the African, American, or Asiatic cultures, 
for instance. The geographic particularity of culture raises 
the issue of relativism of a philosophy tied to a particular 
culture. The different cultures, into which philosophies are 
inserted, imbue the various philosophies with a relativistic 
character. These cultures individualize those philosophies 
(Uduma, 2015, 88). 
 Will it not be foolhardy to ignore, talk less deny, the existence of cultural 
variations, therefore relativity? We accept cultural relativity. But does cultural relativity 
entail (imply) logical relativity? Does the existence of tribe require the tribalization of 
logic? Does pan-African patriotism (Etuk 99-100) necessarily lead us to logical 
relativism? Obviously not! Environments are different, subject-matters are different, 
peoples are different, and therefore cultures are different. Yet, logic is logic, logic is one. 
The uniqueness of the identity of a people does not confer veracity to somewhat obvious 
exercise of manufacture of  tribal “logics”. Uduma, as has been shown above, accepts 
cultural relativity, yet maintains: 
However, I maintain that there is real need to rise above the 
identity problem and the attendant lure into jingoism and 
come to the realization that logic is universal, that there is no 
cultural or regional logic; the call for African logic is thus at 
best only tendentious (89). 
In an earlier work which he entitled Can there be an African Logic? Uduma succinctly 
articulates the position thus: 
For such jingoistic philosophers, from the assertion that there 
exists African philosophy, it became necessary that there is a 
peculiar African logic. We reject this position in this essay 
because we hold that logic is universal with no continental 
boundaries (281). 
Though Georg Hegel, Levy-Bruhl, Robin Horton (65) disparage and sardonically disdain 
the African’s cogno-mental cum intellectual capacities, to tribalize, then manufacture, 
logic is not the way to answer the clarion call of pan-Africanism. This sort of show of 
intellectual patriotism carries with it attendant boomerang consequences (Edor, Against 
the Attempts, 160-172). Again we re-state: logic is one.  As for the exponents  of 
ontologico-pluralistic conception of logic, their “African logician” counterparts have 
variously described the versions  of their “logics” as affective  (Etuk), emotive (Leopold 
Senghor), integrativisit (Ozumba), harmonious  monistic (Ijiomah), Customary  
(Chimakonam 2011,148), ezumezu (Chimakenam 2015, 115 -121), etc. I dare you to pick 
a text of their very rich and enormous literature, pick sporadically or randomly any 
passage from their works, consider if it will be repulsive to the so-called Aristotelian 
traditional logic’s laws of thought. In all their works, not even a sentence is 
resistant/repugnant to the traditional laws of thought. But unfortunately, as it were, I have 
never read even a paragraph from them that has adopted or implemented the requirements 
of their “logics”. Write a little article or monograph, beginning with the 
rules/techniques/principles of ezumezu logic and end with same, then we take you serious. 
Not even the ingenious work on logic of modalities confers legitimacy  on proliferation  
and tribalization of logic. Logic is one! 
Conclusion  
 We find no merit in the, not small, amount of intellectual, and physical energies 
dedicated to the invention, creation, manufacture and eventual tribalization of logic. 
Africa is already ridden with an oasis of cancers as to generate cosmetic and saccharin 
ones, adding salt to injury. These consummate African scholars should therefore redirect 
their impeccable physical and intellectual resources to the resolution of African problems 
that make life expectancy in Africa shorter than anywhere else, that make Africa parade 
currencies with the lowest value in the comity of nations, that make maternal and infant 
mortality rates in Africa highest in the world, that make the literacy and numeracy levels 
in Africa appalling, etc. Can emotive logic solve the problem of corruption in Africa? Can 
integrativist logic confront the problem of HIV/AIDS? Can affective logic grapple with 
the problem of shortage of power supply in  Africa? Can harmonious monistic logic 
tackle the problem of unemployment? Can customary logic obliterate the problem of 
decay and poor infrastructural amenities? Can ezumezu logic bid farewell to the problem 
of insecurity in Africa? It does not appear so. In fact, logic is one! I have argued in a work 
I entitled The Un-necessity of the Existence of African Logic as a Criterion for the 
Existence of African Philosophy that: 
…only one logic exist and that all of humanity participates in this one 
logic. Various attempt at manufacturing/creating/inventing various species 
of logic for Africa are unpatriotic attempt that are insincere and are devoid 
of any epistemic basis. Going through the version or species of logic as 
canvassed by Ijiomah, Udo Etuk, Ozumba and Chimakonma betrays 
insincerity in those adventures. The truth is that African philosophy can 
still be done within, and without violating the stipulations of, classical 
Aristotelian logic. African philosophy does not need ‘African logic’ to 
exist both as a discipline and as an activity among the Africans (212). 
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